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Can the Federal Courts Keep Order in Their 
Own House? Appellate Supervision Through 
Mandamus and Orders of Judicial Councils 
Brent D. Ward* 
In October 1977, the United States Government simultane- 
ously petitioned the Tenth Circuit and its judicial council1 to 
bar Chief Judge Willis W. Ritter of the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah from further participation in fed- 
eral criminal cases.a The Government's petition also requested 
that the business of the District of Utah be reallocated among 
the judges of that district so that no new civil cases involving the 
United States would be assigned to Judge Ritter.' The petition 
alleged that it had "become difficult, if not impossible, to vindi- 
cate in respondent's court 'the public's interest in fair trials 
designed to end in just judgments,' '" and argued that Judge 
Ritter had "become a law unto him~elf."~ 
* B.A., 1970, J.D., 1972, University of Utah; Assistant United States Attorney for 
the District of Utah, 1976-1978; currently a partner in the firm of Nielsen & Senior, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
1. The judicial council of a circuit court of appeals consists of the judges of that 
circuit. 28 U.S.C. # 332 (1976). 
2. The court of appeals was requested to exercise its authority to control district 
courts under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. # 1651 (1976), subsection (a) of which reads: 
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the us- 
ages and principles of law." 
The judicial council was requested to exercise its authority to control district courts 
pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 8 332(d) (1976), which reads: "Each judicial 
council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration 
of the business of the courts within its circuit. The district judges shall promptly carry 
into effect all orders of the judicial council." 
3. Petition of the United States for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition and Petition 
for Order Reassigning Criminal Proceedings and Civil Proceedings Involving the United 
States at 2-3, United States v. Ritter, No. 77-1829 (10th Cir., dismissed as moot Aug. 11, 
1978) [hereinafter cited as Petition]. 
4. Id. at 8 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)). 
5. Id. at 114. The government gave a lengthy rendition of Judge Ritter's questiona- 
ble actions, using quotes from trial transcripts. Id. at 12-112. 
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While admitting that the United States Government had 
never before found it necessary to request that a judge be barred 
from presiding over cases in which it was a party: the Govern- 
ment urged that "[tlhe problem in respondent's court is perva- 
sive,"' that "the administration of justice has broken down in 
the Central Division of the District of Utah,"8 and that the 
"United States has 'no other adequate means to attain the relief 
[it] desires.' "@ 
The allegations against Judge Ritter were further summa- 
rized in the petition as follows: 
He invents and follows his own rules, is swayed by his own 
preconceptions of legal procedure, and is determined that no 
outside force-not the arguments of counsel, not the holdings 
of this Courtshal l  interfere with the conduct of his court. He 
feels no responsibility to the litigants to explain or justify his 
decisions. He brooks no argument and does not tolerate even 
well-mannered opposition to his views. He attempts to make 
his decisions in such a way that this Court will be unable to 
correct his errors.1° 
The Government's petition concluded with a request that 
Judge Ritter be prevented from exercising any judicial or ad- 
ministrative power over a case involving the federal govern- 
ment." The Tenth Circuit never acted on the Government's pe- 
tition in United States v. Ritter.12 Judge Ritter died before his 
response to the court's order to show cause was due. It therefore 
remains unresolved whether the issuance of a writ such as the 
one requested by the Government against Judge Ritter would be 
a proper exercise of an appellate court's power or would consti- 
tute instead a de facto impeachment.lS Until this question is for- 
mally answered, it will not be clear in what degree the federal 
appellate courts have the power to supervise a district judge by 
managing his caseload. 
A strong argument can be made that the federal appellate 
courts should have the power to manage a district judge's 
6. Id. at 117. 
7. Id. at 114. 
8. Id. at 113. 
9. Id. at 117 (quoting Kerr v. United States, 426 U S .  394, 403 (1976)). 
10. Id. at 114. 
11. Id. at 126. 
12. No. 77-1829 (10th Cir., dismissed as moot August 11, 1978). 
13. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text infra. 
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caseload under certain circumstances. For instance, if, as the 
Government alleged in Ritter, a federal district judge refuses to 
try civil cases involving the federal government, tries only a few 
of the felony cases assigned to his court and in most of those 
either commits reversible error or acts unlawfully in a way that 
prevents either conviction or appeal by the Government,14 and 
in other ways systematically prevents the Government from ob- 
taining meaningful relief in his court,l5 then the court has ceased 
to function effectively in that district, at least as far as the Gov- 
ernment, as a party to the litigation, is concerned. Surely, the 
proper exercise of appellate supervision must extend to rehabili- 
tating a federal court that has ceased to function effectively. If a 
judge refuses to follow the mandates of superior courts, as Judge 
Ritter often did,16 the appellate courts or judicial council should 
have power to prevent that judge from continuing to participate 
in cases involving the same party. Without appellate court 
power to grant such relief, the only relief available to an injured 
party in the position the Government faced in Ritter would be 
impeachment; and impeachment is usually not a feasible 
option.'' 
If the problem with a particular judge is not his failure to 
try cases involving a certain party, but an evident bias against 
that party, the appellate courts should still have the power to 
bar the judge from participating in future cases involving that 
party. Any litigant has the right to have a case heard by another 
14. The Government alleged that Judge Ritter would purposely wait until after 
jeopardy had attached in a criminal case before dismissing it, thus denying the Govern- 
ment the opportunity to prosecute the case again or seek appellate review. Petition, 
supra note 3, at 82. 
15. See id. a t  7-11. 
16. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 
(1967), an antitrust case in which Judge Ritter had at trial approved a plan for the geo- 
graphical division of markets between two related pipeline companies. The Supreme 
Court, finding the arrangement illegal under § 7 of the Clayton Act, reversed and re- 
manded with instructions to order divestiture. On remand Judge Ritter again upheld the 
arrangement because "[ilt seems to make a lot of sense to me." Id. a t  142 (quoting the 
trial transcript). He then entered a decree ordering the division of the markets. The 
Supreme Court responded with apparent frustration: 
Id. 
[Judge Ritter's decree] therefore does precisely the opposite of what our prior 
opinion and mandate commanded. Once more, and nearly three years after we 
just spoke, we reverse and remand, with directions that there be divestiture 
without delay and that the Chief Judge of the Circuit . . . assign a different 
District Judge to hear the case. 
at 142-43. 
17. See text accompanying notes 21-22 infra. 
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judge upon a proper demonstration of misconduct, bias, or 
prejudice on the part of the assigned judge? 
Article 11, section 4 of the Constitution states that "all Civil 
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and  misdemeanor^."^^ 
Article 111, section 1 of the Constitution provides that 
judges within the federal judicial system, "both of the supreme 
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Beha- 
viour, and shall at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con- 
tinuance in Office." 
The interface of these two provisions has been the source of 
extensive debate over whether impeachment is the sole remedy 
for judicial malfeasance. The arguments have focused on the im- 
portance of judicial independence on the one hand and on the 
inadequacy of the arduous process of impeachment as a remedy 
for judicial misconduct on the other. Some jurists and scholars 
have urged that our concept of judicial independence requires 
that the judiciary be completely insulated from discipline or 
control except through impeachment." Others have reasoned 
that unless "good behavior" means nothing more than not hav- 
ing been convicted of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the Arti- 
cle I11 language must be read as authorizing discipline or re- 
18. For cases involving Judge Ritter alone, see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 
1358 (10th Cir. 1977); Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976); United States v. Rit- 
ter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960). 
19. There has never been any doubt that article I11 judges are civil officers within 
the meaning of this section. However, only four federal judges have ever been convicted. 
See generally Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal-Some 
Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1930). Thomas Jefferson is 
reported to have said that impeachment is a "bungling way of removing judges" and "an 
impractical thing-a mere scarecrow." See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 295 (1924). 
20. See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 136 
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Kramer & Baron, The Constitutionality of Removal and 
Mandatory Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of 'During 
Good Behavior', 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1967); Kurland, The Constitution and Ten- 
ure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U .  CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969). 
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moval even though the misconduct does not rise to the level of 
an impeachable offense.ll 
Unless there is a means of disciplining judges short of im- 
peachment, there may be no effective remedy for even a very 
serious abuse of judicial power. Impeachment for the commis- 
sion of a felony might be relatively simple, but removal of a dis- 
trict judge for misuse of judicial power and abuse of public trust 
would probably be difficult and time-consuming. Such a charge 
against a judge who is only one among more than 590 federal 
judges and who sits in a sparsely populated state may not suffi- 
ciently shock the public conscience to provoke Congress to ac- 
tion. Even if it does, the lengthy impeachment process would 
leave the district court in a prolonged state of paralysis, and the 
court of appeals would likely find it necessary to reallocate the 
district court's caseload anyway." 
It would be a serious weakness in our system to place sys- 
tematic judicial misconduct beyond the reach of any remedy 
save impeachment. There are limits beyond which no per- 
son-even a federal judge-should be allowed to go with impu- 
nity. The courts themselves have the power and the duty to cur- 
tail the effect of repeated contrary and erratic actions of a judge 
that occur too frequently to permit effective appellate supervi- 
sion in the run of cases. 
In order to avoid the constitutional questions that would be 
raised by the removal of a federal judge for conduct that might 
not constitute an impeachable offense, federal appellate courts 
have occasionally taken measures short of removal when circum- 
stances, although not compelling enough to justify mobilization 
of the impeachment machinery, have nevertheless required im- 
mediate corrective action.s8 Two of these procedures are the is- 
21. See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 122-80 
(1973); Ross, 'Good Behavior" of Federal Judges, 12 U .  KAN. CITY L. REV. 119, 122 
(1944). 
22. This has occurred on at least one occasion. See Hearings on Procedure for the 
Removal of Unfit Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18-19 
(1966) (testimony of Judge John Biggs, Jr.)[Hereinafter cited as Hearings on Removal]. 
23. The "good behavior" clause, US. CONST. art. 111, $ 1, suggests that it is possible 
to remove federal judges from office for bad behavior which falls short of an impeachable 
offense. This law review article does not explore that option, but focuses instead on 
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suance of writs of mandamus under the authority of the All 
Writs ActY and the exercise of the broadly-worded mandate 
given to the judicial councils of the various federal circuits in 28 
U.S.C. section 332(d)? 
The full scope of these remedies remains unexplored, in 
part because opportunities for exploration are relatively rare, 
and in part because their practical use is limited to circum- 
stances in which they will not be characterized as de facto im- 
peachment. Many appellate courts and judicial councils, con- 
scious of the social and professional implications of passing on 
the behavior of fellow judges, have been reluctant to enter this 
arena altogether. Still, these measures are the only formal means 
of discipline yet tried which have the potential of passing consti- 
tutional muster, and for that reason merit a closer look. 
A. Mandamus 
1. Historical background 
The power of higher courts to supervise lower courts by writ 
of mandamus may be traced at least as far back as Blackstone. 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone noted that use of the writ of 
mandamus in England included its issuance by the Court of 
King's Bench 
to the judges of any inferior court, commanding them to do 
justice, according to the powers of their office, whenever the 
same is delayed. For it is the peculiar business of the Court of 
King's Bench to superintend all other inferior tribunals, and 
therein to enforce the due exercise of those judicial or ministe- 
rial powers with which the crown or legislature have invested 
them; and this, not only by restraining their excesses, but also 
by quickening their negligence and obviating their denial of 
justice? 
Speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte 
Crane," Chief Justice Marshall adopted Blackstone's formula- 
tion as the foundation of the Court's opinion. It was held that 
under the Judiciary Act of 1789 the Court possessed a power of 
general superintendence which authorized the issuance of a writ 
remedies short of removal. 
24. 28 U.S.C. 8 1651 (1976). See note 2 supra. 
25. See note 2 supra. 
26. 3 W .  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *110. 
27. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 189 (1830). 
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to compel a lower court to sign a bill of exceptions that it had 
refused to sign.18 The Court equated such a use of mandamus 
with an exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction? 
In Crane, Chief Justice Marshall quoted from the New York 
Supreme Court's opinion in Sikes u. Ransorn,'O which held that 
mandamus "ought to be used, where the law has established no 
specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there 
ought to be one."" The Chief Justice also interpreted English 
precedents as authorizing the writ to require an inferior court to 
do something which a superior court "determines, or at least 
supposes, to be consonant to right and justice."32 
Although these early formulations of the power to issue 
mandamus in aid of appellate jurisdiction included a broad 
power to supervise lower courts, actual use of the writ in this 
country has never reached the limits of these formulations. In- 
stead, for reasons which are not clear, use of the writ soon came 
to be governed by a criterion known as the "traditional stan- 
dard," under which "only exceptional circumstances amounting 
to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of 
this extraordinary r e m e d ~ . " ~  This standard has produced a line 
of federal cases fixing the scope of the writ well within the limits 
of the early  decision^.^^ In each of these cases there existed a 
28. Id. a t  191-92. 
29. In this sense appellate jurisdiction comprehends the appellate court's responsi- 
bility for the "orderly, even and efficient administration of justice within its circuit." 9 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 110.28, a t  305 (2d ed. 1980). 
30. 6 Johns. 279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). 
31. Id. at 280, quoted at 30 U.S. a t  193. 
32. 30 U.S. at 191. 
33. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967). 
34. The following are examples of exceptional circumstances which were found to 
justify the granting of a writ of mandamus: United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for 
S. Dist. of N.Y., 334 U.S. 258 (1948) (district court refused to adhere to the terms of an 
appellate court's mandate); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (district court refused to 
surrender a vessel upon a showing that the Secretary of State had recognized the vessel's 
immunity from suit); McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940) (mem.) (district court 
disregarded one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Ex parte United States, 287 
U.S. 241 (1932) (district court refused to perform the plain ministerial duty of issuing a 
bench warrant upon an indictment sufficient on its face); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 
(1926) (district court threatened the doctrine of federal-state comity by removing a crim- 
inal case from a state court upon an insufficient petition for removal); Ex parte United 
States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) (district court refused to impose a sentence); Kanaster v. 
Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953) (district 
courts granted new trials when they had no power to do so); United States v. Ritter, No. 
76-1331 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 1976) (order granting relief in the nature of mandamus) 
(district court impeded the lawful functioning of a sitting grand jury); United States v. 
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clear abuse of discretion or a usurpation of judicial power giving 
rise to error of sufficient magnitude to justify an extraordinary 
writ. The writ was thuspsually directed at a lower court which 
either lacked the power to do what it purported to do or refused 
to exercise power when it had a duty to do 
Until recent years judicial analysis of the mandamus rem- 
edy was dominated by this "power" rubric, combined with the 
general requirement that the petitioner's claim for relief by ex- 
traordinary writ had to be clear and indisputable." 
2. Modern supervisory mandamus 
The grant of the writ for usurpation of power in a specific, 
pending case is indeed an exercise of supervision, but only in a 
narrow sense. Not until La Buy v. Howes Leather Companys7 
did the broader superintendence of the lower courts mentioned 
by Blackstone begin to find an identity of its own in the United 
States. In La Buy, the Supreme Court approved the issuance of 
a writ of mandamus by the Seventh Circuit to halt a district 
court's questionable practice of regularly referring antitrust 
cases for trial before a special master under rule 53(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By concluding that the prac- 
tice in issue was only questionable-that the discretionary power 
under rule 53(b) was being used too often-and by approving 
the writ as much to discourage the practice as to bar its use, the 
Court signalled an expansion of the mandamus power beyond 
traditional limits. 
Although Justice Clark's majority opinion in La Buy pays 
Ritter, No. 76-1011 (10th Cir. May 20, 1976)(order granting mandamus) (district court 
refused to rule on pretrial motions in a criminal case until after jeopardy had attached); 
United Sates v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976) (dis- 
trict judge refused to.disqualify himself when there existed a reasonable likelihood that 
the case would not be tried impartially); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 
(10th Cir. 1972) (district court defied a rule of a judicial council); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. 
Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963) (district court improperly stayed proceedings in an 
antitrust case); Atlass v. Miner, 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960) 
(district court adopted a local rule inconsistent with the Supreme Court Admirality 
rules); Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1925) (district court refused to hear 
motions on an indictment in a criminal case properly within its jurisdiction). See also 
United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); 
United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958). 
35. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). 
36. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (citing United 
States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)). 
37. 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 
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lip service to the traditional standard by stating that Judge La 
Buy had abused his power, it is rather clear that in the tradi- 
tional sense there was no abuse of power involved. The practice 
of the district court to which the writ was directed in La Buy 
was specifically authorized under rule 53(b) as long as "some ex- 
ceptional conditions [required] it,"" and determination of ex- 
ceptional conditions was left to the trial judge. Thus, it could 
not be said that the district judge acted without or beyond his 
power in referring cases to a master. A judge always has power 
to enter an erroneous order? 
Rather than being a usurpation of power case, La Buy is 
viewed by both courts and commentators as a precedent for ex- 
panded appellate court supervision of lower courts.'O The impli- 
cation has arisen from La Buy that mandamus may be used to 
discourage an erroneous practice and prevent its recurrence, and 
in this context it is the likelihood of recurrence and the need to 
prevent it that are the critical factors, not the jurisdictional ex- 
cess or usurpation of power which were determinative under the 
traditional standard. Hence, notwithstanding the actual absence 
of usurpation of power in the traditional sense, the Supreme 
Court approved the writ, stating: 
We believe that the supervisory control of the District Courts 
by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial admin- 
istration in the federal system. The All Writs Act confers on 
the Court of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of 
mandamus in the exceptional circumstances existing here." 
La Buy also confronted the thorny problem presented in 
many mandamus cases by the final judgment rule. The Supreme 
Court described the problem in another mandamus case, stating: 
"All our jurisprudence is strongly colored by the notion that ap- 
pellate review should be postponed, except in certain narrowly 
defined circumstances, until after judgment has been rendered 
by the trial court."4' The primary purpose of the final judgment 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b). 
39. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967). 
40. See, e.g., United States Bd. of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25, 30 (4th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 911 (1969); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 810 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1965). See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 
HAW. L. REV. 595 (1973). 
41. 352 U.S. at 259-60. 
42. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. at 96. 
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rule is to promote judicial economy by avoiding the expense and 
delay of interlocutory review of issues that might be rendered 
either moot or subject to appeal if the case were allowed to go to 
final judgment. It is a policy against the piecemeal appeal of 
cases. 
Mr. Justice Clark's opinion in La Buy brushed aside the 
final judgment rule with the statement that "[tlhe question of 
naked power has long been settled by this C~urt. '"~ Since there 
was no question that at some stage the appellate court could en- 
tertain appeals in the antitrust proceedings before Judge La 
Buy, the Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals 
possessed the power to issue writs of mandamus reaching those 
proceedings. Thus, the question of granting or withholding the 
writ became one of whether the court's exercise of the manda- 
mus power was proper, rather than whether the court actually 
possessed the power.44 In this same spirit one commentator has 
characterized such an exercise of mandamus power as "an ex- 
pression of prospective or concurrent appellate jurisdi~tion."~~ It 
is a power of review extending to all proceedings where the ac- 
tion of the trial judge might be reviewable at some future time, 
or, put differently, it is an example of appellate jurisdiction 
which is continuously existent over " [m] atters which disturb 
that jurisdiction, either before or after it is inv~ked.'"~ 
The Government contended in United States u. RitteF7 
that it sought a writ of mandamus for the very purpose of avoid- 
ing piecemeal litigation. It alleged that " 'it is in the interest of 
fair and prompt administration of justice' to bring to an end 
piecemeal litigation concerning respondent's conduct of federal 
cases."48 Referring to the petition's documentation of the re- 
spondent's deliberate misuse of judicial powers to thwart justice, 
43. 352 U.S. at 255. 
44. Id. Justice Black essentially agreed in his concurring opinion in Will v. United 
States, in which he stated the following 
Finality, then, while relevant to the right of appeal, is not determinative of 
the question when to issue mandamus. Rather than hinging on this abstruse 
and infinitely uncertain term, the issuance of the writ .of mandamus is proper 
where a court h d s  exceptional circumstances to support such an order. 
389 U.S. at 108 (Black, J., concurring). 
45. Bell, The Federal Appellate Courts and the All Writs Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 858, 860 
(1969). 
46. United States v. Malmin, 272 F. 785, 792 (3d Cir. 1921). 
47. No. 77-1829 (10th Cir., dismissed as moot August 11, 1978). 
48. Petition, supra note 3, at 117 (quoting Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 
394, 403 (1976)). 
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consistent prejudice against the United States, and defiance of 
higher courts, the Government maintained that it sought the 
"resolution in a single case of contentions that govern hundreds 
of cases and that will have a profound effect upon the adminis- 
tration of justice in Utah."4s Quoting La Buy, the Government 
urged that "there is an end of patience"'O and when that stage is 
reached, mandamus lies to achieve the "supervisory control of 
the District Courts . . . necessary to proper judicial administra- 
tion in the federal system."" 
3. Cases since La Buy 
A history now exists of using supervisory mandamus to put 
an end to highly improper judicial conduct which disrupts the 
efficient administration of justice. Relying on La Buy, the 
Fourth Circuit in United States Board of Parole v. Merhige52 
repudiated the former restrictive and inflexible concept of man- 
damus and approved a writ restraining two district judges from 
compelling discovery in a case with tenuous jurisdictional 
grounds.63 In Rapp v. Van Dusen," the Third Circuit discussed 
the latter-day emergence of supervisory mandamus and con- 
cluded that a district judge should not sit in further considera- 
tion of a case which had been the subject of prior mandamus 
proceedings." And in United States v. N e ~ r n a n , ~ ~  the district 
court had entered orders disallowing the Government's preemp- 
tory challenge of certain black jurors, in effect requiring that 
blacks be represented on juries in close proportion to their rep- 
resentation in the general population. The Second Circuit 
granted a writ vacating the district court's orders because the 
orders "cannot but have an immediate and continuing detrimen- 
tal impact on the administration of criminal justice."s7 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 118 (quoting 352 U.S. a t  258). 
. 51. Petition, supra note 3, a t  118 (quoting 352 U.S. a t  259-60). 
52. 487 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974). 
53. Id. at 30. 
54. 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965). 
55. See also United States v. Ritter, 540 ~ . 2 d 4 5 9  (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
951 (1976); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 
950 (1960). 
56. 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
57. Id. a t  251. For examples of the other circumstances where supervisory writs of 
mandamus have been issued to improve the administration of justice, see United States 
v. Ritter, No. 76-1917 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 1976)(order granting mandamus) (writ issued to 
condemn a district court's unreasonable calendaring practices); United States v. Ritter, 
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Mandamus has not been confined to pending cases over 
which the appellate courts would have statutory review jurisdic- 
tion at  a later stage. In the often overlooked case of United 
States u. MalrninYm a writ of mandamus was employed to dis- 
qualify a district judge entirely. In Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. 
James/@ the Supreme Court said that it could issue a writ of 
mandamus to make district courts conform to the equity rules.@O 
In McCullough u. Cosgrave?l a writ was issued to remedy disre- 
gard of federal rules of procedure affecting numerous cases, both 
pending and future. 
Basing his argument on Los Angeles Brush and McCul- 
lough, Justice Harlan urged in his concurring opinion in Chan- 
dler u. Judicial Council of the Tenth CircuitQ that the manda- 
mus power extends to correct judicial acts affecting hundreds of 
cases not yet even filed, stating, "It is difficult to see how the 
very multiplicity of the cases affected by the council's orders 
could derogate from this Court's authority under section 1651(a) 
to  issue an extraordinary writ in aid of its appellate jurisdiction 
over them."68 
In Chandler the Judicial Council had issued an order find- 
ing that Judge Chandler was unable or unwilling to discharge his 
duties efficiently as a district judge and directing that he not act 
in any case filed in that district after a certain date. Judge 
Chandler petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus 
No. 76-1331 (10th Cir. Sept. 10,1976) (order granting mandamus) (writ issued to enforce 
the Tenth Circuit's ongoing supervision of a district judge's handling of a grand jury); 
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976) (order granting man- 
damus) (writ issued to correct improper certification of a class action); In re Virginia 
Electric and Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976) (case remanded) (court held that 
supervisory mandamus can issue to prevent significant waste of judicial effort and to 
offer guidance to district judges concerning correct treatment of a problem not likely to 
be presented on appeal); United States v. Ritter, No. 76-1011 (10th Cir. May 20, 1976) 
(order granting mandamus) (writ issued to require a district court to hear and dispose of 
pretrial motions at least ten days before trial); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 
1968) (writ issued to void a local rule of court limiting pro hac vice ("for this one partic- 
ular occasion") appearances by out-of-state attorneys). 
58. 272 F. 785 (3d Cir. 1921). In Malmin, a governor of the Virgin Islands improp- 
erly discharged one judge and appointed a new one in his stead. The circuit court issued 
a writ to the first judge compelling him to reassume his office, thereby indirectly disqual- 
ifying the second judge. 
59. 272 U.S. 701 (1927). 
60. Id. at 706. 
61. 309 U.S. 634 (1940) (mem.). 
62. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
63. Id. at 115 (Harlan, J., concurring). Section 1651(a) refers to the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. 8 165l(a) (1976). 
2331 APPELLATE SUPERVISION 245 
prohibiting the council from " 'acting [in] violation of its powers 
and in violation of [his] rights as a federal judge and an Ameri- 
can citizen.' '" In his majority opinion denying the petition, 
Chief Justice Burger did not reach the issue of whether jurisdic- 
tion existed to entertain the action, holding that the petition 
was not ripe because other avenues of relief were still open to 
Judge Chandler. Nonetheless, in his concurring opinion Justice 
Harlan proceeded to the merits of the case. He concluded that 
jurisdiction existed because Judge Chandler's reliance on section 
1651(a) 
is bottomed on the fact that the action of the Judicial Council 
"touches, through Judge Chandler's fate, hundreds of cases 
over which this Court has appellate or review jurisdiction." 
. . . Although thii expansive use of section 1651(a) has no di- 
rect precedent in this Court, it seems to me wholly in line with 
the history of that statute and consistent with the manner in 
which it has been interpreted both here and in the lower 
c0urt.43.~~ 
Although the majority in Chandler did not reach the man- 
damus issues, writs have been issued in several other instances 
in which they affected both pending cases and a "multiplicity" 
of cases yet to be filed? 
4. Advisory mandamus 
In Schlagenhauf v. Holder? the Supreme Court approved a 
form of advisory mandamus to resolve important questions of 
first impression that the courts of appeal wish to settle expedi- 
tiously. Schlagenhauf involved the first challenge to a district 
court's power to require a party to submit to a physical or 
mental examination under rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that because of the 
unusual circumstances of the case the court of appeals "had the 
power to review on a petition for mandamus the basic, unde- 
cided question of whether a district court could order the mental 
or physical examination of a defendant."m 
64. 398 U.S. at 76-77 (first brackets in original). 
65. Id. at 113 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
66. See United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Ritter, No. 76-1917 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 1976) (order granting mandamus); United States v. 
Ritter, No. 76-1011 (10th Cir. May 20, 1976)(order granting mandamus). 
67. 379 US.  104 (1964). 
68. Id. at 110. 
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Advisory mandamus can be characterized as an extension or 
amplification of supervisory mandamus for use where the or- 
derly administration of justice hinges on a prompt resolution of 
an important, novel question. But how much Schlagenhauf ex- 
tended the scope of appellate courts' mandamus power is not 
clear.69 The scope of the Schlagenhauf rule has been character- 
ized as narrowly as the Ninth Circuit's statement in Goldblum v. 
National Broadcasting Corp.?O that "a petition for a writ of 
mandamus is 'properly before [a] court on a substantial allega- 
tion of usurpation of power [involving] an issue of first impres- 
~ion,"'~' and as broadly as the Sixth Circuit's statement in 
United States v. United States District Court for Eastern Dis- 
trict of Mi~higan?~ that the "Courts of Appeals have the power 
to review by mandamus 'an issue of first impression,' . . . in- 
volving a 'basic and undecided problem.' '73 One court read the 
case law on advisory mandamus as authorizing "such mandamus 
only where the decision will serve to clarify a question that is 
likely to confront a number of lower court judges in a number of 
suits before appellate review is p~ssible."?~ But other courts 
have not imposed that requirement on the issuance of advisory 
writs. There also seems to be some question whether the doc- 
trine of advisory mandamus applies to criminal cases.?' 
5. Summary 
While questions remain concerning the scope of supervisory 
and advisory mandamus, there is no doubt that La Buy and 
Schlagenhauf have breathed new life into the mandamus power. 
The La Buy-Schlagenhauf rationale is not restricted to the pro- 
69. See Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1976). 
70. 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978). 
71. Id. a t  906 n.2 (quoting Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. a t  111) (brackets in 
Goldblum) (emphasis added). Here the court clearly is attempting to restrict the scope of 
the Schalgenhauf-type writ. The "usurpation of power" language was commonly used in 
cases under the traditional standard, when the scope of mandamus was narrow and rigid. 
72. 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
73. Id. a t  656 (quoting Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. a t  110). 
74. National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, Inc. v. 
Richey, 510 F.2d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975). 
75. Compare I n  re United States, 598 F.2d 233, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Today we 
need not and do not decide whether the doctrines of 'supervisory' and 'advisory' manda- 
mus apply in criminal cases, where the policy against piecemeal appeals, particularly by 
the Government, reaches its zenith.") with I n  re Arvedon, 523 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1975) 
(the court, citing Schlagenhauf, relied in part on the fact that the petition raised a ques- 
tion of first impression to grant a writ of mandamus in a criminal case). 
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tection of existing appellate jurisdiction. It extends to the pro- 
tection of appellate jurisdiction in cases yet unfiled and in cases 
that may never reach the courts of appeals because of district 
court errors or misconduct that deprive the appellate courts of 
jurisdiction. Whether or not a claim of judicial misconduct arises 
in a suit already pending in the district court (and a case serving 
as a "vehicle" for such a claim could easily be found if neces- 
sary) mandamus should supply a remedy. 
The La Buy line of cases supports the exercise of "inherent 
powers of appellate jurisdiction to effectuate what seems to . . . 
be the manifest ends of justice,"76 whether that jurisdiction is 
exercised to correct defiance of a higher court, delay of justice, 
or judicial bias and whether the misconduct is isolated or recur- 
rent. All these considerations are within the "vital corrective and 
didactic . . . aims [which] lay at  the core of . . . [the] decision 
in La Buy and Schlagenhauf u. Holder."77 
B. The Judicial Councils 
The judicial councils of the federal courts of appeals are 
creatures of the Administrative Office Act of 1939.7e Subsection 
(d) of the Act empowers a judicial council to make "all necessary 
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the 
business of the courts within its circuit. The district judges shall 
promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council.''@ 
Notwithstanding this mandate and the need to use it from time 
to time, the judicial councils, with rare exceptions, have not even 
begun to explore their purpose and potential. They have been 
described as "pillars of passivity" and the "rusty hinges of fed- 
eral judicial administrati~n."~~ 
The legislative history of the judicial councils suggests an 
intention to grant them broad authority. Testifying in support 
of the bill that became the Administrative Office Act, then Chief 
Judge Groner of the District of Columbia Circuit described the 
function of the councils: "[Wlhatever is wrong in the adminis- 
tration of justice, from whatever sources it may arise, [should 
76. United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 
9 w  (1960). 
77. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967). 
78. Ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 48 U.S.C.). 
79. 28 U.S.C. 8 332(d) (1976). 
80. See Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administra- 
tion, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970). 
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be] brought to the attention of the judicial council, that it may 
be corrected, by the courts themselves . . . . ,981 
The most important legislative document pertaining to the 
judicial councils since their creation is a 1961 report to Congress 
which contains the following statement concerning section 332?% 
It seems patent that . . . the legislative understanding and 
object of the provision, was that it imposed upon a judicial 
council the responsibility of seeing that the work and function 
of the courts in its circuit were expeditiously and effectively 
performed; and that this responsibility of observation, supervi- 
sion and correction went to the whole of a court's functioning, 
in both personal and institutional aspect. 
. . . .  
. . . [Tlheir responsibilities and power extend, not merely 
to dealing with the questions of the handling and dispatching 
of a trial court's business in its technical sense, but also to 
dealing with the business of the judiciary in its broader or in- 
stitutional sense, such as the preventing of any stigma, disre- 
pute or other element of loss of public confidence occurring as 
to the Federal courts or to the administration of justice in 
them, from any nature of action by an individual judge or a 
person attached to the courts.8s 
1. Cases under the Administrative Ofice Act 
Chandler v. Judicial CouncilM is the sole case arising out of 
aggressive disciplinary action taken by a judicial council against 
a federal district judge. As noted earlier, a majority of the Su- 
preme Court decided that Judge Chandler still had other ave- 
nues of relief open to him to contest the merits of the judicial 
council order, and therefore denied the judge's petition for a 
writ of mandamus. In his concurring opinion Justice Harlan 
called the judicial council's order "a permissible interim step to- 
ward exploration and solution of the problem pre~ented"~~ and
"entirely within the authority of the C~uncil."~' Furthermore, 
81. Hearings on S. 188 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1939). 
82. See note 2 supra. 
83. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE POWERS AND RE- 
SPONSIBILITIES OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCILS, H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 
(1961). 
84. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
85. Id. at 125 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
86. Id. at 119. 
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the "circumstances, taken as a whole, established a prima facie 
basis for the Council's conclusion that some action was appropri- 
ate to alleviate what the Council members perceived as a threat 
to public confidence in the adminstration of justice."87 
Again, Justice Harlan urged that section 332(d) was in- 
tended "to encompass the making of orders that would . . . 
channel cases to other judges when a situation existed with re- 
spect to one judge that was inimical to the effective administra- 
tion of justice."88 
Congress thoroughly reexamined the powers of the judicial 
councils and reenacted subsection (d) verbatim in 1971, fully 
aware of the use made of that authority by the judicial council 
in Chandler. 
The actual scope of the councils' power has been addressed 
in very few cases. In Hilbert v. D~ol ing ,~@ the Second Circuit 
considered the power of its judicial council to adopt rules for the 
prompt disposition of cases. The court held that dismissal of 
criminal charges under such rules was with prejudice and there- 
fore precluded reindictment for the same offense. For authority 
that section 332 was intended to grant broad powers to the judi- 
cial councils, the court quoted the following statement from an 
article by former Chief Judge Lumbard: " 'As this language is 
about as broad as it could possibly be, there is no doubt that 
Congress meant to give to the ijudicial] councils the power to do 
whatever might be necessary more efficiently to manage the 
courts and administer justice.' "@O 
In Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritteqel the Tenth Circuit 
granted a writ of mandamus to enforce prior orders of the Tenth 
Circuit Judicial Council regarding the division of business in the 
District of Utah. The court held that the judicial council has 
broad power to see that "the district court's business is con- 
ducted effectively, expeditiously and in a manner that inspires 
87. Id. at 125. 
88. Id. at 121. 
89. 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). 
90. 476 F.2d at 360 (quoting Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils 
in the Administration of the Courts, 47 A.B.A. J. 169 (1961)) (emphasis added by the 
court). The court also quoted then Judge Warren E. Burger, who stated that 5 332 was 
intended to "confer almost unlimited power" upon the circuit judicial council to deal 
with "any problem-whatever it may be-relating to the expeditious and effective ad- 
ministration of justice within the circuit." Id. at 360. 
91. 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972). 
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public confiden~e."~ 
The Third Circuit has also taken a broad view: its judicial 
council reassigned all criminal cases to other judges when one 
district judge became suspected of ~orruption.~~ 
The judicial councils offer great promise for relief from pat- 
terns of judicial conduct which threaten public confidence in the 
federal court system. Indeed, the councils were established for 
the very purpose of taking whatever action is necessary to 
thwart "a threat to public confidence in the administration of 
justice."? 
IV. ARTICLE I11 AND APPELLATE SUPERVISION F LOWER 
COURTS BY MANAGING CASELOADS 
Article 111, section 1 of the Constitution contains language 
that is considered the heart of the doctrine of judicial indepen- 
dence. The salary and tenure provisions of Article I11 provide 
that judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour," 
and that their salary may not be "diminished" during their ten- 
ure. Thus, even though judicial decisions may often be politi- 
cally or socially unpopular, the judge's power to make his own 
decisions is largely protected from threats of removal from office 
or from financial pressures. The question of how much control 
short of impeachment can or ought to be exercised by other gov- 
ernmental officers, including appellate court judges, over judges 
who "misbehave" without offending the Article I11 prohibitions 
is not yet fully answered. 
The conflict on this point is brought into focus in the mi- 
nority opinions in Chandler v. Judicial C o u n ~ i l . ~ ~  Justice Black 
filed a vigorous dissent in which he argued that the judicial 
council order barring Judge Chandler from hearing cases filed 
after December 28, 1965 amounted to a removal from office. 
This, he argued, violated the Constitution, since the salary and 
tenure provisions of Article I11 guaranteed that judges could be 
removed only by impeachment proceedings before Congres~.~ 
92. Id. at 1103. 
93. See Hearings on Removal, supra note 22, at 19 (testimony of Judge John Biggs, 
Jt.). 
94. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 US. at 125 (Harlan, J., concurring). The abil- 
ity of judicial council to fulfill this purpose has recently been enhanced by the enactment 
of the Judicial Council Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 9648,  94 Stat. 2035. 
95. 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
96. Id. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting). See also id. at 136-37 (Douglas, J., dissent- 
ing). Justice Douglas vehemently argued that the Constitution gave judges "no power 
. . . to censor or discipline any [other] federal judge and no power to declare him ineffi- 
* 
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On the other hand, Justice Harlan argued in his concur- 
rence that the council's order was not a removal from office, but 
nothing other than "an effort to move along judicial traffic in the 
District Court."97 
Had the majority reached the merits in Chandler, the ques- 
tion of the point at which appellate court management of a dis- 
trict judge's caseload becomes an unconstitutional removal from 
office-a de facto impeachment-may have been decided. 
The Chandler case represents a situation in which caseload 
management by the appellate court was carried to the extreme. 
No matter how the Court may have decided the issue of judicial 
management in that context, an analysis of the case law shows 
that reassignment of a category of cases away from a particular 
judge, as the Government requested in Ritter," should not be 
constitutionally suspect. 
Article I11 does not contain a guarantee that a judge will be 
allowed to decide any particular types of cases. In fact Article I11 
specifically vests in Congress the power to establish "inferior 
courts" and to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts, including 
the Supreme Court. Pursuant to this constitutional power, Con- 
gress has established our present geographically-defined district 
and circuit court systems, and has created special courts of lim- 
ited subject matter jurisdiction, such as the Court of Claims and 
the Court of Customs and Patent  appeal^.^^ Furthermore, Con- 
gress has withdrawn from certain courts, including the Supreme 
Court, the jurisdiction to proceed with cases already before them 
and even these acts were found to be consistent with Article 
111. loo 
Congressional power to control the jurisdiction of the fed- 
eral courts is not limited to setting the jurisdictional bounds for 
each type of court, but also reaches the qualifications of individ- 
ual judges. For example, Congress has gone so far as to enact 
laws requiring judges to disqualify themselves under certain 
~ i r ~ ~ m s t a n ~ e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
As discussed above, courts have used statutory mandamus 
cient and strip him of his power to act as a judge." Id. at 137. 
97. Id. at 119 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
98. Petition, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
99. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (holding that such special courts are 
Article 111 courts). 
100. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901); Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
101. See 28 U.S.C. $5 144, 455 (1976). 
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and the supervisory powers of the judicial council to bar a judge 
from hearing a particular pending case and even to affect a 
judge's power over the conduct of a "multiplicity" of cases not 
yet filed. Such actions have been upheld as constitutional and 
within the Congressional mandate embodied in the statutes. 
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Glidden u. Zda- 
nok,lo2 described the history of Congress' Article I11 power as 
follows: 
The great constitutional compromise that resulted in agree- 
ment upon Art. 111, § 1, authorized but did not obligate Con- 
gress to create inferior federal courts. . . . Once created, they 
passed almost a century without exercising any very significant 
jurisdiction. . . . Throughout this period and beyond it up to 
today, they remained constantly subject to jurisdictional 
curtailment.10s 
This power of Congress to curtail the jurisdiction of federal 
courts is neither an aspect of the impeachment power, nor an 
encroachment upon the independence of Article I11 judges. To 
the extent the existence of this power demonstrates that im- 
peachment is not the sole means of disciplining or controlling 
judges, it opens the door to acceptance of appellate court orders 
reallocating the caseload of district judges to improve the expe- 
ditious and effective administration of justice. 
Thus, it is not necessary that a precise standard be laid 
down as to how far such reallocation may be taken under Article 
I11 in order to decide that a judge may be barred from hearing a 
category of cases as the Government requested in Ritter. 
Whether the need for such orders arises out of a simple backlog 
in the district court, disagreement among district judges, or the 
improper conduct of a single problem judge, Article I11 does not 
bar an appellate court from granting such relief. "Some supervi- 
sory and administrative control of judges by other judges is nec- 
essary if we are to have a functioning judiciary as well as a sit- 
ting one."lW 
Under Article 111 no federal judge should be subject to disci- 
pline only because he makes erroneous decisions. Whereas the 
102. 370 US. 530 (1962). 
103. Id. at 551 (citations omitted). 
104. Petition, supra note 3, at 124. 
2331 APPELLATE SUPERVISION 253 
Constitution does shield judges against unpopularity, it does not 
shield them from corrective action by other judges designed to 
ensure that the law is effectively administered. The appellate 
courts have the power to prevent action so obviously improper 
as to place it beyond established rules of law. The power of a 
district judge is great and the opportunity for abuse too frequent 
to limit appellate supervision to decisions in cases appealed in 
due course. Where the rule of law has been effectively nullified 
by district judges, higher courts should not hesitiate to restrain 
them. 
Congress has seen fit to give the appellate courts the neces- 
sary supervisory power, through the use of writs of mandamus 
and orders of the judicial councils, to impose restraints short of 
impeachment to ensure that the law is effectively administered 
by the lower courts. Although principles of judicial indepen- 
dence make it clear that such restrainte may not disturb a fed- 
eral judge's salary or tenure, appellate courts should not other- 
wise hesitate to alter the caseload of a judge if appropriate to 
provide temporary, interim, or even long-term relief from judi- 
cial misbehavior. For above all, those provisions of law securing 
the independence of the judiciary were not created for the bene- 
fit of the judges, but for the benefit of the judged. 
